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Claiming the City: Co-operation and Making
the Deal in Urban Comprehensive Land
Claims Negotiations in Canada

CHRISTOPHER ALCANTARA Wilfrid Laurier University
JEN NELLES University of Toronto
Introduction
Comprehensive land claims ~CLC! agreements, otherwise known as modern treaties, have had a powerful effect on Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
These agreements, which can only be negotiated by those Aboriginal
groups that have never signed treaties, are supposed to empower Aboriginal peoples by transferring to them significant amounts of land, money,
power, and authority. Frequently, such treaties also involve the creation
of Aboriginal self-government, either as part of the land claims agreement itself or through a separate agreement and always require Aboriginal peoples to relinquish their undefined Aboriginal rights in exchange
for a set of defined rights listed in the treaties. By gaining these resources,
jurisdictions, and self-government rights, Aboriginal groups hope to have
the tools to successfully protect their cultures, govern themselves more
effectively, and foster greater economic wealth and independence.
Since the creation of the CLC negotiations process in 1973, only 22
Aboriginal groups have completed treaties while many others have not.
A number of scholars and practitioners have speculated as to why some
Aboriginal groups have been unable to complete treaties. Several commentators point to the fact that treaties are completed only when the
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claimed lands contain significant resource development opportunities for
Canadian governments and businesses ~Rynard, 2001; Feit, 1980; Diamond, 1985!. Others argue that negotiations tend to take a long time
because Aboriginal and government actors bring different understandings of the treaty process to the negotiating table ~Tully, 2001; Abele and
Prince, 2003!. Former Yukon Premier Tony Penikett ~2006! and scholars
Ravi De Costa ~2003!, Colin Samson ~1999!, and Andrew Woolford ~2005!
place the blame on uninterested governments, unmotivated negotiators,
and the inherent power imbalances found within the negotiating process.
Finally, Christopher Alcantara ~2007! suggests that variation in treaty
negotiation outcomes can be best understood by examining, on the one
hand, the institutional structures governing treaty negotiations and, on
the other, the goals and strategies employed by participating Aboriginal
actors.
Although all of these contributions have furthered our knowledge
about modern treaty negotiation outcomes in Canada, none looks at the
complications that arise when lands within a major municipality are
involved. This omission in the literature is surprising since a significant
number of treaty negotiations in Canada involve or have involved municipal lands. These types of negotiations need further study since they are
crucial sites of contestation between competing Aboriginal and nonAboriginal claims.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the complications that arise
when municipal lands are at the centre of modern treaty negotiations.
More specifically, we suggest that co-operation between First Nations
and municipal governments is unlikely to occur unless a number of theoretical factors are present. To develop this argument, we conducted interviews and gathered primary and secondary sources to study the Kwanlin
Dün First Nation treaty negotiations in the Yukon Territory. Although
there were no direct negotiations between the Kwanlin Dün First Nation
and the city of Whitehorse, their ability to co-operate indirectly with
each other was crucial for the completion of the treaty.1 We focus on
this particular case because it was the first modern treaty involving
land located in a major municipality. As well, many observers at the
time believed that Kwanlin Dün’s treaty would never be completed
because its claim involved municipal lands. Yet Kwanlin Dün was able
to complete a treaty in 2005. As such, this paper will be relevant to
other sets of treaty negotiations involving land located within major
municipalities.
The structure of this paper is as follows. It begins by providing some
background information on modern land claims in Canada before outlining a theoretical framework through which bilateral relations between First
Nations and municipal governments can be analyzed. This perspective is
adapted from Nelles’ ~2009! theory of intermunicipal co-operation which

Abstract. Since their introduction in 1973, comprehensive land claims ~CLC! agreements have
become important mechanisms for Aboriginal peoples to achieve their political, social, cultural, and economic goals. Although the literature on CLC negotiations is a rich and varied one,
it has tended to ignore the role that municipal governments have on influencing negotiation
outcomes. This lacuna is surprising since a number of treaty negotiations in the Yukon Territory
and BC involve lands located in major municipalities. This paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the influence that municipal governments can have on treaty negotiation outcomes. Using a case study of the Kwanlin Dün First Nation treaty negotiations in the
Yukon Territory, we find that institutional and milieu factors are important. However, leadership was the most important and decisive factor.
Résumé. Depuis leur apparition en 1973, les ententes portant sur les revendications territoriales globales sont devenues des mécanismes importants pour les peuples autochtones dans
l’atteinte de leurs objectifs politiques, sociaux, culturels et économiques. Bien que la documentation sur ces ententes soit volumineuse et variée, elle tend à ignorer le rôle influent que jouent
les administrations municipales lors de telles négociations. Cette lacune est surprenante, dans
la mesure où plusieurs de ces traitésconcernaient des territoires situés dans des zones urbaines
d’importance de la Colombie-Britannique et du Yukon. Cet article vise à développer un cadre
théorique pour mieux comprendre l’influence des administrations municipales dans le dénouement de négociations territoriales. En utilisant l’étude de cas des négociations de la Première
nation de Kwanlin Dün au Yukon, nous constatons l’importance de la structure institutionnelle
et communautaire. Cependant, le leadership demeure le facteur le plus crucial lors d’un tel
processus.

argues that although institutional and milieu variables are important to
structuring relations and incentives, often the most powerful explanation
for co-operative outcomes is related to regional stocks of civic capital
and factors such as leadership and networks. The case of the Kwanlin
Dun treaty negotiations is examined using this theoretical lens. Finally,
the paper concludes that, while institutional and milieu factors are key to
understanding the successful resolution of this land claims agreement,
leadership was the most decisive factor.
Background Considerations
The Canadian federal government has established two negotiation processes for managing its treaty relationship with Aboriginal peoples: the
specific claims process and the comprehensive land claims ~CLC! process. The specific claims process is designed to address alleged wrongs
or mistakes committed by the federal government in its interpretation
and implementation of Aboriginal treaties. It can also be used by nontreaty Aboriginal groups to address the federal government’s mismanagement of Indian assets.
The second process, and the one that is the focus of this article, is
the CLC process created in 1973. Up to 1921, the federal government
had been negotiating land surrender treaties with Aboriginal peoples in
western and northern Canada. In 1921, the federal government ended
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its policy of negotiating new treaties. In its place, it employed a variety
of assimilation mechanisms designed to bring Aboriginal peoples into
mainstream society. In response, Aboriginal peoples began to organize
themselves politically in the 1960s to protect their lands and ways of
life ~Scholtz, 2006!. The key turning point was in 1973, when the
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Aboriginal title did in fact exist.
Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that his government would begin treaty negotiations to facilitate the exchange of
undefined Aboriginal rights for a set of specific treaty rights ~Alcantara
2008!.
Since 1973, 22 groups have completed modern treaties while many
others, most of which are located in British Columbia, have not. Of those
Aboriginal groups still negotiating under the comprehensive land claims
process, approximately 35 involve Aboriginal-claimed lands that fall
within municipal boundaries. Unfortunately, we are unable to determine
with precision how many negotiations involve municipal land transfers
because most negotiations have yet to reach the land selection stage. For
those negotiations that have progressed to the stage where municipal land
transfers may be under consideration, government and Aboriginal officials have refused to comment on whether they are considering municipal land transfers. Nonetheless, it is clear that a significant number of
ongoing negotiations involve Aboriginal-claimed lands within municipal
boundaries and therefore the case of the Kwanlin Dün will be of relevance to those negotiations. According to one anonymous government
official, First Nations tend to choose sites that fall within the boundaries
of Canada’s major cities. Historically, many Aboriginal groups spent considerable time at locations along and at the intersection of major rivers,
streams, and waterbodies. These areas, which were valuable gathering
places prior to contact, remain so today. As a result, municipalities are
extremely interested in how treaties will affect their lands and jurisdictions. Therefore, securing municipal co-operation either directly ~through
negotiating municipal land transfers! or indirectly ~through regular consultations! is a very important goal for federal, provincial, territorial, and
Aboriginal governments, if just to allay municipal political opposition to
future settlements.
The KDFN negotiations are an especially appropriate and crucial
case because commentators and officials at the time believed that it would
be one of the most difficult among the Yukon negotiations to complete,
since its claim involved municipal lands in a territorial capital. As well,
some observers pointed to a particularly confrontational negotiator and
to significant internal and leadership divisions as other crucial obstacles
to treaty completion. Therefore, in many ways the KDFN treaty is a rigorous and ideal case for testing the applicability of interlocal co-operation
theories to land claims agreements involving municipal lands.
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Theoretical Framework
According to Theresa Dust ~1997! and city of Whitehorse officials, municipal governments have serious concerns about the impact of modern treaties on their citizens, lands, and jurisdiction. Specifically, municipal
governments worry about the compatibility of municipal and Aboriginal
laws with respect to land use, zoning, economic development, garbage collection, snow removal, parking meters, utilities, police services, and bylaw
enforcement. They are also concerned about tax revenue losses resulting
from the conversion of municipal lands into treaty settlement lands. Finally,
municipal government actors face uncertainty with respect to the actual
parcels of land that are to be transferred to the Aboriginal government. City
of Whitehorse officials all mentioned that there was significant reluctance and apprehension regarding the possibility of an Aboriginal treaty
affecting their authority within the city’s boundaries.
Municipal reluctance and apprehension are also exacerbated by the
fact that municipal governments do not have a seat at the negotiating
table. Rather, CLC negotiations occur between the federal, provincial or
territorial, and Aboriginal governments. The only way in which city officials can directly participate in negotiations is if the provincial or territorial government is willing to represent their concerns at the negotiating
table. In essence, in most CLC negotiations municipal governments are
reluctant, passive participants who have little incentive to co-operate.
Although municipal governments are not involved directly in the
negotiations, they are involved indirectly through consultations with
the provincial or territorial governments. These consultative processes
are designed to seek municipal input and to gain municipal support for
the completion of treaties. According to Dermot Flynn ~2006!, chief negotiator for the Yukon territorial government, the consultative processes
used in the Yukon were used to gather input and to show municipal officials that Yukon First Nations were governments and not corporations
who were going to flip the land for profit and private gain. Rather, the
land was going to be held in collective ownership for the benefit of the
First Nation governments and their citizens. Moreover, the consultative
exercises were designed to show that First Nation governments had similar goals to municipal ones, especially with regard to economic development and the quality of life of their citizens.
The following section establishes a theoretical lens to examine bilateral relationships between First Nations and municipal governments. This
framework is necessarily broad as it is intended to describe relations
between these two types of government in general and is not specifically
geared to CLC negotiations in which there are several intermediary actors
~that is, federal, provincial, territorial and Aboriginal governments!. However, in cases where the resolution of a CLC involves urban land trans-
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fer, a secondary transaction is often required, which will typically involve
the sale of lands as well as an agreement regarding the conditions of
transfer to which municipal governments must assent. Therefore, while
this type of co-operation is not typically a factor in CLC negotiations
outside of urban areas, the framework can be applied to cases where secondary negotiations require agreement between municipal governments
and First Nations. Even if these negotiations are not direct and are conducted through an intermediary ~such as the provincial or territorial government! the framework still holds. It is still a case where co-operation,
whether tacitly or explicitly negotiated, is required between these two
types of actors.
First Nations and municipal governments in Canada are comparable
and can therefore be discussed in similar terms. In principle, both forms
of government administer a territorially specified jurisdiction, provide
services to their citizens, and participate in the implementation of policies developed at senior levels of government. Both are governed by a
democratically elected council and leader. Tennant ~2000! contends that
while First Nations governments face a distinct set of challenges relative
to non-Aboriginal communities, a large proportion of the daily concerns
that occupy municipal politicians are also shared by First Nations leaders. Yet it is important to note that many First Nations reject the characterization of their governments as municipal, despite the similarities.
The most crucial differences in these two varieties of local government lie in their decision-making processes, and more importantly, in
constitutional status. McAllister ~2004! notes that while practical administrative concerns of governing a locality may be comparable to those
of small municipalities, the process of decision making may vary depending on the traditions of the band. More emphasis may be placed on community participation in decision making and chiefs may have little
autonomy in the face of broad opposition than other political leaders.
There may also be more reliance on consensus-based decision making
~McAllister, 2004: 24!. Where this type of decision making prevails,
comparisons can still be made with municipal governments, provided
that these different dynamics and incentive structures are recognized.
For instance, in such cases the motivations for leadership decisions
cannot be read exclusively from the agendas and incentives faced by
formal leaders.
As is the case with municipal governments, institutional and constitutional status varies from province to province. Broadly speaking, constitutional differences emerge to the extent that First Nations communities
have a relationship directly with the federal government—as well as with
the provinces—while municipalities in Canada have delegated authority
through provincial or territorial governments.2 The 1988 amendment of
the Indian Act extended taxation powers akin to those held by municipal-
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ities to band councils, thereby providing Aboriginal governments with
comparable tools for economic development and self-government.
Therefore, while we would certainly not contend that municipal governments and First Nations bands share the same set of considerations or
incentive structures, they are certainly similar in a number of respects.
For the purposes of examining municipal–First Nation bilateral relations, particularly in urban areas, a framework delimiting intermunicipal
relations can be legitimately adapted.3
The theoretical literature on intermunicipal co-operation is relatively well developed ~see especially Feiock, 2007; Feiock, 2004; Steinacker, 2004 Post, 2004 Oakerson, 2004!. However, it suffers the general
shortcoming that it tends to be very US-centric and reliant on a narrow
rational-choice perspective. The application of this approach to intermunicipal co-operation has some utility in outlining the incentive structures
faced by the various actors in the partnership negotiations across many
areas of co-operation. Rational-choice perspectives, however, tend to rely
heavily on the characteristics of the issue at the heart of co-operation to
explain outcomes ~ Feiock, 2007; Steinacker, 2004; Post, 2004!. This has
the twin result of privileging specific issues, such as visible costs, over
the institutional factors that may affect political decisions, making conclusions very issue and context specific. While rational-choice approaches
are helpful in describing the incentive structures that shape the preferences of individual actors over time, in the application to intermunicipal
co-operation literature, these are less effective in identifying the effect of
more stable political structures on co-operative outcomes. Ostrom ~2005!
argues that second-generation rational-choice theories are beginning to
address the institutional dimensions of co-operation. However, many of
these approaches are still quite narrowly focused on the internal dimensions of partnership agreements or single-variable cases ~Steinacker, 2004;
Post, 2004!. Few of these accounts of intermunicipal co-operation incorporate a broad spectrum of variables and, as such, there are no comprehensive theories of intermunicipal co-operation. Nor are those that attempt
to address multiple variables ~ Feiock, 2007! structured to effectively
address issues, such as the effect of leadership or civic networks, in structuring collective action. Consequently, a broader and more holistic framework has the potential to more effectively illuminate the dynamics at play
in the negotiation of inter-local co-operative agreements.
Nelles ~2009! advances just such an alternative approach to explain
the emergence and intensity of intermunicipal co-operation. It combines
aspects of rational choice with historical institutionalism to develop a
framework of factors that may impact the decisions of local actors to
engage, or not, in interlocal partnerships. This perspective argues that
while these factors certainly have an effect on co-operation, their effects
may be mitigated in regions where civic capital is more developed. Civic
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capital, derived in large part from a critique of social capital literature, is
defined as interpersonal networks within a community based on a shared
identity, expectations or goals and tied to a specific region of locality
~Nelles and Wolfe, 2008!. The concept emphasizes the importance of
leaders—civic entrepreneurs—in intensifying and formalizing collaborative networks within and between communities. As such, the central focus
of a civic capital approach is on the networks and leaders that make up
the community and how they can be adapted to shifting policy opportunities. So, while institutional and contextual factors do indeed play an
important role in shaping decision-making environments, the emergence
of co-operation can often be explained more effectively with a view to
the role of civic capital.
In the context of intermunicipal relations this approach combines
geographical, institutional and milieu variables with an analysis of regional
civic capital to explain the emergence and intensity of co-operation on
regional economic development. A slightly modified version of this basic
framework can be applied to co-operation between municipal and First
Nations governments. Because these relationships tend to be bilateral,
geographical factors—which deal with issues of group size—can be discarded. However, a number of institutional variables are still applicable.
These variables describe the extent to which agendas and abilities align
in any given context to produce a co-operative result.
Differences between the powers of mayor and chief may affect the
facility with which agreements are reached. When a mayor or chief is
hamstrung by indecisive councils, this may impact the shape and speed
of co-operation. From this perspective, political leaders that have more
autonomy may make decision making much easier to achieve. The degree
of local autonomy may also impact co-operation. This factor can be conceptualized both in terms of jurisdictional and fiscal autonomy. When a
municipal government has very few autonomous areas of jurisdiction,
its political leadership may be wary of ceding authority when land claims
involved a transfer of both territory and authority. Therefore, the degree
to which this transfer affects municipal service delivery, for example,
will have an effect on the form and outcome of intergovernmental
co-operation. From a fiscal point of view the same principle holds. When
municipalities have a wide variety of funding tools they may be more
willing to cede taxing authority over a part of their tax base to First
Nations groups.4
Power asymmetry is also an important factor to consider in
co-operative relationships. The degree to which partners vary in their
power will determine whether the relationship is coercive and also affect
the motivations of the actors. Asymmetries in municipal–First Nations
relations can stem from a variety of sources. In this case, the degree of
bureaucratic organization or access to resources can impinge on infor-
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mation availability and bargaining chips in negotiations. Issues, such as
public opinion, may also come into play under this variable. When the
public is highly polarized or supportive of one actor over the other, this
lends weight to the legitimacy of claims and increases ~or decreases!
the political costs of non-compliance. Interestingly, perceptions of power
asymmetries can often impact the character of co-operation more than
actual power distributions.
The final institutional variable is external government involvement,
and the potential for the threat of upper-level government involvement. In
the case of Kwanlin Dün treaty negotiations, government involvement is
most likely to emerge from one or both upper levels of government. To
the degree that municipal governments are the wards of the provincial and
territorial governments, these actors have the ability to intervene. This
intervention, or the threat of intervention, also shapes decisions. For
instance, in the case of land claims, it is within the jurisdiction of the provincial government to expropriate municipal land for transfer to First
Nations groups. Under such circumstances municipal governments may
be more amenable to reaching a negotiated settlement.
Milieu variables are those non-institutional factors that may shape
decisions to co-operate or not. These can be disaggregated into internal
and external threats or opportunities. The presence of internal threats may
increase the incentives for collaboration. For example, if the city faces
high unemployment or high levels of social problems there may be an
incentive to resist co-operation. However, the opposite may also hold true
as the presence of shared problems may prompt collaborative solutions.
Internal opportunities can be as potent as threats. When both parties stand
to gain from a partnership or agreement co-operation is typically easier
to negotiate. External threats can be as local as specific environmental
problems or as global as the vagaries of the market. Whatever external
factors may shape co-operative decisions should be taken into account in
the analysis of collaborative behaviour. The effect, positive or negative,
on the emergence of co-operation is entirely dependent on the nature of
the threat or opportunity and the positions of the actors involved. It is
conceivable that the same threat, for instance, would have different effects
on the bargaining positions of each actor.
Finally, while each of these factors can play an important role in
affecting municipal–First Nations relations, local civic capital can overcome barriers to co-operation or complement existing co-operative relationships. In intermunicipal relationships the concept of civic capital relies
on gauging associational activity within a region, networks between associations, the presence and evolution of key civic leaders, and an assessment of the history of civic interaction. In the context of municipal–First
Nations relationships the most important factors are leadership and the
state of bridging networks. Social capital literature often ignores the
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impact of visionary leadership in the establishment of collaborative relationships ~Brass and Krackhardt, 1999; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001!. However, charismatic and forward-thinking leaders can often effectively bridge
different networks ~for instance, between municipal and First Nations leaders or bureaucracies! to forge co-operative links. Alternatively, or concurrently, co-operation can be built from below in the form of informal
networks between communities based on self-interest. In other words,
these networks need not necessarily be oriented towards a formal bridging of forums but can be based on a number of motivations ~commercial, personal, social, and so forth! and either formalized, as part of an
organization, or informal. Where there are visionary and charismatic leaders and robust networks, co-operation is more likely to emerge. However, these two factors are quite different to predict and measure. A
detailed qualitative analysis is required to establish which actors and networks are relevant in co-operative negotiations. One critical point is that
leadership is not always positive—it can be used negatively to oppose
partnerships and collaborative solutions. That is why the presence of both
leadership and complementary networks are important factors to determining where co-operation will emerge.
Taken together the variables outlined above constitute a range of
factors that may influence the emergence of inter-local co-operation. It
provides a framework with which to analyze empirical cases. However,
one of the central hypotheses of Nelles’ approach is that institutional
and milieu variables may have different effects in different cases. Therefore, it is not expected that the same variables will be relevant across a
variety of issues or cases. This model contends that, regardless of institutional or milieu effects, regions characterized by higher levels of civic
capital will exhibit greater degrees of co-operative intensity and will be
more likely to reach co-operative agreements.

Kwanlin Dün Comprehensive Land Claims Negotiations: A Case of
First Nation–Municipal Government Co-operation
The Kwanlin Dün case illustrates the extent to which institutional and
milieu variables can structure incentives for co-operation in land claims
negotiations. Indeed, the “deal breaker” in this particular case was the
transfer of waterfront lands from the City of Whitehorse to the Kwanlin
Dün First Nation. The following section presents a history of the Kwanlin Dün treaty negotiations and outlines the key issues at stake. The negotiations are then analyzed using the theoretical framework elaborated
above. While many institutional and milieu factors play a role in structuring the terms of these negotiations, leadership, armed with civic capital, proved decisive in securing an agreement.
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Umbrella Final Agreement Negotiations: 1973–1995
In contrast to other regions in Canada, Aboriginal peoples in the Yukon
Territory had never signed treaties with the Crown nor did they ever
receive reserve lands. After the Calder decision in 1973, the Yukon First
Nations, of which there are fourteen, were one of the first Aboriginal
groups in Canada to begin comprehensive land claims negotiations with
the federal government. The Yukon First Nations were represented at the
negotiating table by the Yukon Native Brotherhood ~representing status
Indians in the Yukon! and the Yukon Association of Non-Status Indians
~DIAND, 2002; McClellan, 1987: 99–104!. In late 1973, the federal government initiated negotiations by making “a unilateral, public offer of
settlement” to the two organizations ~ Frideres, 1986: 289!. Both groups
quickly rejected the offer, forcing the federal government to change its
offer into a working one open for negotiations. Formal negotiations began
in early 1974 between the Yukon Native Brotherhood ~YNB!, the Yukon
Association of Non-Status Indians ~YANSI!, and the federal government. At this point, the Yukon territorial government ~YTG! did not have
its own seat at the negotiating table. Rather, negotiations were bilateral
and YTG officials sat as part of the federal negotiating team.
In 1979, the federal government invited YTG to join the negotiating
table as a separate and equal negotiating party. One year later, the Yukon
Native Brotherhood and the Yukon Association of Non-Status Indians
decided to merge into the Council of Yukon Indians ~CYI! to represent
all Yukon Aboriginal peoples at the negotiating table ~McClellan, 1987:
103!. With the territorial government at the table and the Yukon Indian
organizations amalgamated into one umbrella organization, comprehensive land claims negotiations moved forward relatively quickly.
In early 1984, the negotiators completed an agreement in principle
~AIP!. However, at its general assembly in Tagish, the CYI failed to ratify the AIP. In June 1987, the federal government, the YTG, and the CYI
resumed land claims negotiations to negotiate a deal that would be acceptable to the membership of the CYI. The negotiators made swift progress
and in 1989, the three parties signed a new AIP. Confident that the CYI
would ratify it this time, the negotiators turned to drafting an umbrella
final agreement. Again, negotiations proceeded quickly and in early 1993,
the CYI, the federal government, and the YTG signed the umbrella final
agreement, which transformed the AIP into a final treaty. In March 1993,
the CYI at its usual quarterly board meeting ratified the umbrella final
agreement despite the vigorous opposition of the Kaska nations. In 1994,
Parliament passed settlement legislation officially bringing the umbrella
final agreement into effect
The umbrella final agreement ~UFA! is essential for understanding
the Kwanlin Dün claim because the UFA is the framework that each Yukon
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First Nation must use to negotiate its individual final agreement. The
UFA specifies the amount of land quantum and financial compensation
that each Yukon First Nation will receive upon completing its individual
final agreement. It also sets out the range of powers that each Yukon
First Nation can negotiate. In essence, the UFA requires that all Yukon
First Nations adopt its text as the basis for their own final agreements.
Each First Nation can, however, negotiate “specific provisions” that clarify or slightly modify the original text according to the unique circumstances of the First Nation.
During the final stages of the UFA negotiations in the early 1990s,
some federal, territorial, and Yukon First Nations officials were becoming impatient with the land claims process. Therefore, the parties agreed
to allow the CYI to identify four Yukon First Nations to begin negotiating individual agreements concurrently with the UFA negotiations ~Joe,
2006; Koepke, 2006; McArthur, 2006; Mitander, 2006!. The four that
were chosen were Champagne0Aishihik, Nacho Nyak Dün, Teslin Tlingit, and Vuntut Gwitchin. These first four Yukon First Nations completed final agreements in 1995. After these treaties were completed, the
federal and territorial governments began negotiating with all of the
remaining Yukon First Nations at separate tables.
Kwanlin Dün First Nation Negotiations
Kwanlin Dün negotiations commenced in late 1995, but very little progress
was made until 1999. During these four years, negotiations were hampered or delayed by a number of factors. The most relevant obstacle for
this study was the election of Joe Jack as chief of Kwanlin Dün First
Nation in 1996. Upon taking office, he fired the entire staff of the land
claims department, immediately ending land claims negotiations with the
federal and territorial governments. Moreover, Chief Jack’s action sparked
a series of intense and highly publicized confrontations between his supporters and the supporters of the fired land claims staff, paralyzing the
First Nation until the election of Rick O’Brien as chief in March 1999
~McNeely, 1998; Northern Native Broadcasting Yukon, 1998; 5 Northern
Native Broadcasting Yukon, 1996; Parker, 1999!.
Towards an Agreement: 1999 to 2002
The election of Rick O’Brien was an important turning point because he
was able to quell the political infighting that had plagued Kwanlin Dün
since the mid-1990s. Moreover, O’Brien resurrected the land claims
department and appointed a new department head, Tom Beaudoin, to
restart land claims negotiations with the federal and territorial governments. In the eyes of federal and territorial officials, Beaudoin was a wel-
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come relief from the previous team. He immediately put together a new
negotiating team to restart negotiations. Members of his team included
lawyer Keith Brown, consultant Lindsay Staples, and Kwanlin Dün citizen and lawyer, Mike Smith, who would later become chief of Kwanlin
Dün in 2003.
By 1999, three Yukon First Nations ~Little Salmon0Carmacks First
Nation, Selkirk First Nation, and Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in First Nation! in addition to the original four had completed individual final agreements. By
the time Beaudoin’s team was ready to restart negotiations in 1999, government negotiators felt they had completed enough of the other claims
to begin focusing on the Kwanlin Dün. Rather than building on the work
that the previous Kwanlin Dün negotiating team had accomplished during the mid-1990s, Beaudoin’s team restarted negotiations from scratch.
To speed up the process, his team identified a number of crucial issues
that the three negotiating parties had to resolve before a treaty could be
completed: the inclusion of waterfront lands in Whitehorse as settlement
lands, clarification of the First Nation’s self-government powers in the
city ~that is, land use planning!, property taxation exemptions ~because
all land transferred under a treaty would immediately become taxable
and would probably bankrupt Kwanlin Dün!, and the development of more
robust economic measures ~because Kwanlin Dün lands had limited fish,
wildlife, and resource opportunities to generate economic development!
~Beaudoin, 2006; Brown, 2006; Flynn, 2006; Koepke, 2006; King, 2006!.
Although negotiators made decent progress during the first year of
negotiations with Beaudoin’s team, two events helped negotiations move
forward. The first was the appointment of Robert Nault ~August 1999 to
December 2003! as Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. In
April 2000, Nault announced that the federal mandate to negotiate with
the remaining Yukon First Nations would end on March 31, 2002, unless
each of the tables could come to a memorandum of understanding to
continue negotiations past the deadline ~Tobin, 2000!. Kwanlin Dün officials embraced the deadline as an opportunity to create pressure on themselves and on their government counterparts to complete a treaty.
The second event was the election of a progressive Whitehorse
municipal council, led by Ernie Bourassa, mayor from 2000 to 2006.
Throughout the course of Kwanlin Dün’s negotiations, the city of Whitehorse had virtually no role in the negotiations. Although the city was
allowed to send the occasional representative to observe negotiation sessions, it did not formally participate in negotiations. Rather, it was forced
to rely on the territorial government to represent its interests ~Armour,
2006; Bourassa, 2006; Flynn, 2006; McCullough, 2006; Stockdale, 2006!.
The city, however, still had an important influence on negotiations. Historically, Kwanlin Dün members had spent significant amounts of time
living on the banks of the Yukon River in Whitehorse. Unfortunately, the
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only available waterfront land in the city was owned by the municipal
government, which had purchased the former Motorways Trucking Yard
property several years earlier. Previous city councils had been generally
hostile to a Kwanlin Dün land claims agreement. However, the newly
elected city council, led by Mayor Ernie Bourassa, was more receptive
and was willing to dispose of the Motorways property as long as it was
developed by the First Nation to foster tourism. Moreover, Bourassa and
other city officials liked Kwanlin Dün’s plan to build a commercial office,
a retail building, a restaurant, a small hotel, and a cultural centre on the
Motorways property. The city ultimately agreed to sell the Motorways
property to the territorial government so that it could then include it in
the Kwanlin Dün treaty ~Armour, 2006; Bourassa, 2006; Stockdale, 2006;
Tobin, 2002b; Waddell, 2003!.
A Final Agreement in Sight: 2002 to 2005
Several days before the March 31, 2002, deadline, Kwanlin Dün negotiators signed a memorandum of understanding ~MOU! with their government counterparts, thus settling all of the major issues that the team
had originally identified in 1999 ~Beaudoin, 2006; Brown, 2006; Tobin,
2002a!. With a completed MOU in hand, the negotiators spent the next
year and half finalizing and initialing the documents that would make
up the Kwanlin Dün treaty. These documents included the final agreement, the self-government agreement, the implementation plans, and the
ancillary agreements ~specifically the Kwanlin Dün Programs and Services Transfer Agreements and Kwanlin Dün Collateral Agreement!. The
agreement was ratified in 2004 and came into operation in 2005 ~Tobin,
2005!.
The Kwanlin Dün Final Agreement is noteworthy on a number of
fronts. First, although Kwanlin Dün received the smallest amount of settlement lands among the Yukon First Nations, its lands have the potential
to be the most valuable in terms of economic development by virtue of
being located in the territorial capital. Second, chapter 21 of the treaty
on taxation of settlement lands is quite different from other Yukon agreements in that it allows Kwanlin Dün settlement lands to remain tax free
until the lands are developed or if certain time periods ~usually between
15 to 20 years! are reached ~ Flynn, 2006; Kwanlin Dün First Nation Final
Agreement, 2004: 345!. Third, the economic measures chapter gives the
Kwanlin Dün government additional powers in light of the few fish and
wildlife resources on its lands. These powers include a strategic economic development investment fund, the right to acquire up to a 25 per
cent interest in resource and energy products, control over quarry leases,
a plan to increase the number of Aboriginal government workers on Kwanlin Dün lands, the first right to acquire certain lands if the government
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decides to dispose of them, and the first right to acquire a number of
gaming, tourism and farming licenses. Fourth, Kwanlin Dün agreed to
provide a compatible land use guide in the treaty to give advance notice
to non-Aboriginal peoples who owned lands next to Kwanlin Dün lands
about the band’s intentions regarding land use. Fifth, most of Kwanlin
Dün’s lands in the city of Whitehorse was designated as type 2, meaning
that Kwanlin Dün has limited self-government powers over these parcels. The result is that in most cases they must adopt and use city bylaws
and enforcement officers for these lands. Finally, the city and Kwanlin
Dün negotiated a municipal services and infrastructure agreement, listing the types of municipal services that the city would provide in exchange
for certain amounts of monetary compensation ~Kwanlin Dün First Nation
Final Agreement, 2004!.

Inter-“Municipal” Co-operation as the Basis for CLC Resolution:
An Analysis of the Decision to Transfer Municipal Land
According to federal, territorial, municipal, and Aboriginal officials, the
inclusion of waterfront land was the deal breaker for the treaty. Yet, at
the time there was no waterfront land available except for those owned
by the city. In essence, the city’s ownership of waterfront land gave it a
powerful veto over negotiations. Why did the city of Whitehorse agree to
sell the Motorways property to YTG so that it could include it in the
treaty?
Before providing our answer to this question, it is important to emphasize that there were no official negotiations between Whitehorse and Kwanlin Dün representatives. According to a number of interviewees, Chief Rick
O’Brien visited Mayor Ernie Bourassa in his office one day and mentioned that he was having difficulty with Yukon territorial government officials over the inclusion of waterfront land and suggested that this issue
was developing into a major obstacle to the completion of the treaty. The
mayor informed Chief O’Brien that the city owned the Motorways Trucking Yard parcel and did not care who developed it as long as it was developed. After that meeting, Mayor Bourassa approached Yukon Premier
Duncan and some of her staff and ministers with the idea of selling the
property to the territorial government, but, according to Mayor Bourassa
~2006! and City Councillor Stockdale ~2006!, they rejected the offer. Two
months later, after significant pressure from Chief O’Brien and his negotiating team, territorial officials approached the mayor about whether his
offer was still available and he said yes, thus facilitating the completion
of the treaty.
From a theoretical perspective a number of factors played a role in
shaping this decision. The central factors to this case from among those
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developed in the theoretical framework are internal opportunities, autonomy considerations, existing relationships, and, most importantly, leadership. Indeed, local leadership was significant both in the decision to
reopen negotiations and in the crucial sale of the waterfront lands.
Because negotiations never took place directly between the Kwanlin Dün and the city of Whitehorse questions of power asymmetry
between leaders in this case were not a factor. However, several other
institutional and milieu considerations did play a role in the decision to
transfer the land to YTG. Concerns about the impact of the treaty on
local autonomy certainly factored into the final decision to sell the land.
Primary among these concerns were questions about how the land would
be taxed and serviced. From the municipal point of view there was an
opportunity cost associated with ceding urban territory in the form of
lost assessment. This issue was a particular concern since the territorial
government had the authority to alter taxation regulations as part of the
land claims negotiations. Some uncertainty existed about how the municipality and First Nations governments would relate over issues of taxation, service delivery, and jurisdictional issues as many of these issues
were being resolved concurrently with the transfer through the selfgovernment treaty negotiation process. Under the final agreement Kwanlin Dün First Nations occupying settlement lands within the city are
subject to local bylaws to the degree that they are applicable. The Kwanlin Dün have the authority to set their own legislation, supersede local
bylaws, and take on authority for local functions ~such as planning and
zoning! as a self-governing community; however, this is rarely done. It
also establishes that settlement lands within the city boundaries are subject to municipal property taxes. However, prior to the transfer of lands
the municipality had only a vague idea of the fiscal ramifications of the
deal as it related to assessment, but because the sale was projected to
be largely revenue-neutral in the long term, co-operation on this issue
was more forthcoming.
Significantly, the availability of information about how the city and
First Nations government would relate to one another in a shared municipal space was helpful to the decision to transfer lands. Prior to the agreement the city of Whitehorse had a history of co-operation with urban
Kwanlin Dün—particularly on issues regarding the servicing of First
Nations land. These service agreements were typically mundane and dealt
with issues such as water and waste removal agreements. In fact, as the
transferred lands were undeveloped at the time, the city and Kwanlin
Dün governments entered into a joint agreement to service the parcel on
a cost-sharing basis. This agreement was negotiated separately from the
land transfer and claims agreement. However, the precedent of previous
similar negotiations and relationships eliminated a good deal of the uncertainty surrounding the transfer and smoothed the process of the sale.
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From the perspective of internal and external threats, the most significant in this case related to internal opportunities that the transfer
afforded. One local official commented that the development of the waterfront land and construction of a Kwanlin Dün cultural centre were not
construed as bad outcomes from the city’s point of view. Separate from
fiscal considerations often associated with development are issues related
to the public good and civic values. Kwanlin Dün and non-Aboriginal
Whitehorse communities have co-existed for a very long time and will
and must continue to occupy the same space. Maintaining a long-term
functional relationship is seen as a priority and a matter of pride. As such
the city of Whitehorse endorsed the development ~still pending! of the
cultural centre as a visible and accessible way of integrating the Kwanlin
Dün culture into the city and as an opportunity to celebrate its diversity.
If the development of the land had been contested, it is unclear whether
the transfer would have been more difficult to negotiate. However, it is
interesting to note that in this case, interests surrounding the purposing
of the land generally aligned.
Senior government involvement can be a powerful catalyst for cooperation. Because municipal governments have no constitutional standing and are governed by their provincial and territorial governments, the
potential existed for YTG to exert pressure on Whitehorse to expedite the
sale. In theory, the threat of expropriation could have been used to compel a non-compliant council to an agreement. In this case, upper-level government involvement was not necessary, nor was any threat informally
made.6 That the city of Whitehorse was generally compliant establishes
that this is indeed a case of voluntary co-operation in which the city acted
as an autonomous agent in the decision to transfer the land.
The most important factor was a change in Kwanlin Dün and city of
Whitehorse leadership. In 2000, the city of Whitehorse elected a new
mayor, Ernie Bourassa, and a more progressive city council. In contrast
to previous councils, interviewees mentioned that Bourassa’s government was more open to the idea of a completed treaty. Bourassa’s government was interested in developing the waterfront and saw the treaty
as an opportunity to facilitate the development of that property for the purposes of tourism. Indeed, the city officials felt that a treaty was necessary because the uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of Kwanlin
Dün’s land claim made it impossible to develop the waterfront properties. Interviewees also mentioned that there was pressure emanating from
Whitehorse citizens who were tired of the negotiation process and wanted
certainty regarding access rules to municipal lands and clear designations of which lands belonged to Kwanlin Dün.
City co-operation was also facilitated by the election of Kwanlin
Dün Chief Rick O’Brien in 1998. In contrast to previous Kwanlin Dün
governments, O’Brien quickly gained the respect of federal, territorial,
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and local officials for his ability to reduce political infighting, improve
financial management, and show a commitment to negotiating a deal
that would be compatible with federal, territorial, and especially municipal, interests ~for the importance of compatible goals for treaty completion, see Alcantara, 2007; Abele and Prince, 2003!. This latter point is
important because it explains why Kwanlin Dün agreed to a number of
provisions in the treaty that try to take into account municipal interests.
For one, the Kwanlin Dün First Nation agreed to provide land use designations for those lands located within municipal boundaries that were
compatible with adjacent non-treaty lands. Negotiators also agreed that
most of Kwanlin Dün’s lands would be subject to Kwanlin Dün laws
that were reproductions of city bylaws and were enforced by city bylaw
officers. For instance, Kwanlin Dün could pave undeveloped roads but
only in accordance with city standards. Finally, Kwanlin Dün agreed to
have the city provide municipal services like garbage collection and snow
removal, among other things, in exchange for sufficient monetary
compensation.
In essence, municipal co-operation was facilitated by a change in
municipal and Aboriginal leadership and the confluence of institutional
and milieu variables that generally supported a co-operative outcome.
While other variables contributed to an amenable incentive structure for
the land transfer, leaders on both sides of the deal played an instrumental
role in smoothing the transition. It is remarkable that in the context of
such complex and protracted land claims negotiations the city of Whitehorse was able and willing to play a critical role to facilitate an agreement through this secondary land transfer deal.

Leaders Matter: An Explanation
It is clear from the above historical narrative and analysis that significant
institutional and milieu constraints were present. City of Whitehorse officials were interested in economic development opportunities and were concerned about the effect that land claims agreements would have on their
ability to develop the waterfront and other Aboriginal-claimed lands within
city borders ~Stockdale 2006; Bourassa 2006!. Developing the waterfront, in particular, had long been a goal for city officials throughout the
1990s and until today. Hampering the realization of these goals were factors such as not having a direct voice in land claims negotiations and therefore not having any direct influence on how the land claims agreement
would affect municipal interests in development and land use. There was
also some significant fear regarding the effect of a completed land claims
agreement on the jurisdiction of the municipal government. Indeed, city
officials and politicians were concerned that the treaty would result in a
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checkerboard of Kwanlin Dün First Nation ~KDFN! and city of Whitehorse laws and regulations. One city official and several territorial officials also mentioned that the relationship between some municipal and
KDFN officials was strained prior to 2000.
In terms of KDFN leaders, their goal was to somehow acquire waterfront land. Since all of the land surrounding the river was privately owned
except for the city-owned Motorways Trucking Yard, and since there was
no possibility of expropriation due to internal federal and territorial policies ~ Flynn 2006; Koepke 2006!, it was clear that KDFN officials would
have to somehow convince the city of Whitehorse to dispose of its trucking yard property. Yet the ability of KDFN officials to do so was very
much hampered by internal conflicts and the state of their leadership,
described above. KDFN local politics prior to the election of Chief
O’Brien was very much in a state of paralysis due to infighting between
two factions who were struggling over the leadership of the band.
Although these institutional and milieu constraints were significant, they were eventually overcome by the emergence of new leaders
in both communities, armed with significant civic capital resources. In
the case of Chief Rick O’Brien, his resources came partly from victory
over the factional candidates that had dominated KDFN politics previously. During his campaign, he stressed constantly that he was not connected with either faction. Instead, he was strongly committed to band
unity and responsible and accountable government. He also promised to
restart and complete land claims negotiations, which had been derailed
by infighting among local factional leaders. Overall, his electoral victory reflected a community that now wanted to move beyond the infighting to restore a more functional government. It also reflected a desire
to restart and complete treaty negotiations. Indeed, federal, territorial,
and KDFN officials all point to O’Brien’s election as a crucial turning
point in KDFN negotiations.
Mayor Ernie Bourassa’s electoral victory in 2000 was very much a
surprise. He was a political novice, having never held public office, and
had a much lower profile than the other candidates, such as Tom O’Hara.
At the same time, the city government was experiencing significant turnover among its senior officials, coinciding with the retirement of the
incumbent mayor, Kathy Watson. Bourassa’s successful campaign focused
on waterfront development and to a lesser extent, the completion of land
claims negotiations, both of which were welcomed by the Whitehorse
electorate. As such, Bourassa’s victory meant that he had a clear mandate to move on waterfront development and on the land claims issue.
Once elected, he fulfilled this mandate by transferring the Motorways
property to the territorial government with the knowledge that KDFN
planned to develop it in a way that was congruent with the city’s vision
of the waterfront, described above.
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As well, the land transfer was facilitated by a set of pre-existing
personal relationships that Ernie Bourassa had with KDFN members and
leaders. The two most important of these relationships were with Chief
Rick O’Brien and with KDFN negotiator Mike Smith, who later succeeded O’Brien as chief of KDFN in 2003. Bourassa was friends with
both prior to becoming the Mayor of Whitehorse, first meeting Mike
Smith, for instance, while playing minor hockey. These pre-existing relationships were crucial in the decision of Bourassa to transfer the Motorways Trucking Yard to the YTG for inclusion in the KDFN deal. Once
the transfer was completed, KDFN officials agreed to adopt a set of
unique treaty provisions, described above, that were compatible with the
political and economic interests of the municipality.

Conclusion
Although this paper examines only one case, future research could profitably draw upon our framework and findings to understand and explain
other treaty negotiations involving municipal lands. As well, our framework could be applied usefully to other instances of First Nation–municipal
co-operation that do not involve CLC negotiations. The Aboriginal politics and municipal governance literatures have largely ignored the wide
range of non-treaty intergovernmental relations that have formed between
First Nation and municipal governments. For instance, First Nation and
municipal governments are currently co-operating with respect to economic development initiatives, land use planning, and the provision of
municipal services, among other things. Our framework would be helpful for understanding these and other cases of co-operation between different types of Aboriginal and municipal governments throughout the
country and perhaps elsewhere in other settler societies like the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand. Indeed, even in these countries, very
little is known about how or why Indigenous and municipal governments
co-ordinate their activities.

Notes
1
2

It should be noted here that treaty negotiations involved formal bargaining between
the federal government, the territorial government, and the Kwanlin Dün First Nation.
Cities have, indeed, partnered with federal authorities on specific policies—in these
cases the provincial governments are also typically involved. On some issues cities
have been able to negotiate directly with the federal government, bypassing provincial stewardship; however instances of this are rare and do not indicate the emergence of municipal–federal bilateral relations comparable to that of First Nations
councils in Canada.
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4

5

6
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“Adapted” to the degree that the following framework is applied with some variations to account for significant differences. When this is a factor it is noted in the
theoretical framework.
It should be noted that, on the above three indicators, many of these institutional
factors are likely to be similar across cases in Canada. From a qualitative point of
view, it is still worth exploring the impact these variables have on decision making
and how they contribute to the story of municipal–First Nations co-operation. However, they will be of most use in international comparisons where there will likely be
more variation between cases on these institutional dimensions.
The Northern Native Broadcasting, Yukon ~NNBY! provides radio ~CHON-FM 98.1!
and television ~NEDAA! programming on issues affecting Indians living in the Yukon.
The NNBY is owned and operated by the fourteen Yukon First Nations.
Not only were threats unnecessary, but one local official commented that it was doubtful that expropriation could legally take place as it would be difficult to make the
case that it was in the public good, the acid test for expropriation cases.
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